Evaluating Public Attitudes and Farmers’ Beliefs towards Climate Change Adaptation: Awareness, Perception, and Populism at European Level by Ricart Casadevall, Sandra et al.
land
Review
Evaluating Public Attitudes and Farmers’ Beliefs
towards Climate Change Adaptation: Awareness,
Perception, and Populism at European Level
Sandra Ricart 1,* , Jorge Olcina 2 and Antonio M. Rico 1
1 Water and Territory Research Group, Interuniversity Institute of Geography, University of Alicante,
03690 Alicante, Spain; am.rico@ua.es
2 Laboratory of Climatology, Department of Regional Geographic Analysis and Physical Geography,
University of Alicante, 03690 Alicante, Spain; jorge.olcina@ua.es
* Correspondence: sandra.ricart@ua.es; Tel.: +34-965-903-426
Received: 26 November 2018; Accepted: 24 December 2018; Published: 29 December 2018 
Abstract: The scientific understanding of climate change is firmly established; it is occurring, it
is primarily due to human activities, and it poses potentially serious risks to human and natural
systems. Nevertheless, public understanding of this phenomenon varies widely among farmers and
the public, the two-target audience of this paper. This paper introduces two research questions: (1)
How climate change is perceived by public-farmers’ nexus; and (2) How perception and populism
(as a thin-ideology moved by social forces) interact? In order to address both questions, we review
insights from different sources (literature, research projects, and public opinion services) over the
last 10 years. The results proved how public experience of climate change is interdependent with the
belief that climate change is happening. What is also notable is that the greater the years of farmers’
farming experiences, the greater the percentage rate of their climate change awareness. Differences
among farmers and public perceptions were also noted. Uncertainty, coupled with skepticism,
the media, and political will, are common findings when asking to farmers and the public for the
main weaknesses in adaptation to climate change. However, scientific consensus, meteorological
data, barriers to adaptation, and the role of technology are subjects in which both differ.
Keywords: climate change; public; farmers; adaptation; perception; populism; Europe
1. Introduction
Global climate change is altering our relationship with the environment, modifying relatively
stable climate factors and making them uncertain, unpredictable and threatening [1–3]. Changes
in land use and an increasing demand for water resources have affected the capacity of ecosystems
to sustain food production, ensure freshwater resources supply, provide ecosystem services and
promote rural multifunctionality [4]. Ensuring food production does not just depend on increasing
water efficiency, promoting crops that are more climate resilient or reducing land-use competition for
urbanization. Changes in climate (precipitation, temperature, radiation, evaporation, wind) also bring
major shifts in food supply [5]. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) conducts both
the Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES), focused on greenhouse gas emissions projections,
and Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), a consistent set of socioeconomic, technology,
and biophysical assumptions. According to them, by the 2050s climate change will increase the risk of
simultaneous crop failures (including corn, rice, vegetables and legumes) if irrigation systems are not
duly adapted to water stress situations [6]. A changing climate could have both positive and negative
effects on crops and agriculture systems. Dinesh et al. [7] identify three major challenges to be addressed
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by the agricultural sector. Firstly, climate change affects crop productivity and food security, disrupting
agricultural sector and rural livelihoods [8]. Secondly, an increase of food production is required in order
to produce 60% more food by 2050 by sustaining an increasing number of smallholder farms [9]. Thirdly,
up to one third of all human-caused anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions come from agriculture, and
farmers are advised to abandon vulnerable crops in the face of climate change [10,11].
Negative effects or alterations can also be extended to river systems and the rural matrix. On the
one hand, these can occur through the variation of average temperatures and shifts in precipitation
patterns. On the other hand, through an increase in the occurrence and intensity of meteorological
extreme events (i.e., sudden floods, prolonged droughts, variation on land moisture, hurricane winds
beyond the tropics) [12,13]. Both issues are expected to magnify regional differences within Europe [14].
Projected trends identify specific impacts on land and water bodies depending on Northern and
Southern Europe context, as reported in IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) [15] and emphasized on
IPCC AR5. According to the European Environment Agency (EEA), climate change is projected to also
affect the availability and quality of water in Europe, putting additional pressure on southern regions,
most of them already facing water stress. For example, in the Mediterranean region climate change
affection will be focused on a decline in precipitation, soil water content, and river flow, entailing
increasing plant respiration rates. In turn, this would decrease the production yield of crops and could
even result in the invasion of weed, pathogens, and pests [16]. Consequently, a drastic reduction in
agricultural yields can significantly hinder ensuring food security. In addition, an increased risk of
biodiversity loss, more competition between different water users, or the expansion of habitats for
southern disease vectors are also contemplated [17,18]. However, the situation in the Atlantic and
Continental regions are clearly opposed: increase in river flow and risk of river floods and heavy
precipitation events, and decrease in summer precipitation [19,20].
Climate change-related threats to agriculture and rural landscapes also affect natural resources (such
as water or land) at global and regional scales, and this has motivated an increasing amount of attention
to the analysis of adaptation and mitigation strategies duly applied by farmers, and more interest in
how the public1 values these measures and their efficiency and cost [21]. Why is public engagement
with climate change and farmers’ perception important? While some environmental problems appear
to be more amenable to purely technical solutions [22], in democratic societies, public engagement is an
added-value when addressing policies and programs able to provide mitigation and adaptation actions
to climate change. For instance, stronger public engagement is a pressing priority in order to foster
individual-level actions, enable people to take an active role in public debates and foster public support
for climate protection policies [23]. Further, how farmers perceive climate change uncertainties and
potential impacts and risks is important for two reasons. Firstly, local experience can be shared and
compared through the members of the rural community and this would be useful to identify common
patterns and individual strategies. Secondly, being aware of climate uncertainties, potential risks, and
observed impacts on agricultural systems due to climate change is the first step towards adaptation [24].
Farmers develop their activity supporting the complexity of interrelated nature and human
systems characterized by political, economic, institutional, cultural and biophysical conditions [25].
Both their actions and non-actions are also scrutinized by the public, which can support them when
these actions are in line with food security and the provision of ecosystem services or criticize them
when their activity provokes impacts in natural resources [26]. Personal experience, local knowledge,
familiarity, and social-learning exchange between farmers and the public may help to promote mutual
understanding and to reduce agricultural systems vulnerability. In addition, this could override
political and social barriers to action on climate change and promote an integrated response to a shared
problem: ensuring food security in a sustainable way taking into account climate change impacts [27].
Differences in levels of concern about climate change between left-wing and right-wing political parties
1 The ‘public’, in this context, refers to individuals who do not have an expert scientific knowledge.
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and their constituencies are well documented [28]. Support for right-wing parties and ideologies has
been connected with unconcern about climate change. Consequently, right-wing populism tends to be
contrary to climate policy in different regions and countries, such as USA, Australia and Europe (since
2009 political polarization about climate change increased, particularly in Anglophone countries) [29].
Consequently, both at national and European scales, their leaders and supporters are considered
skeptics to the scientific mainstream [30]. According to Jäger [31], ‘populism’ is considered a concept
with different and complementary semantic dimensions. Overseeing this multidimensional concept,
two distinct approaches can be highlighted when addressing climate change issues. On the one hand,
populism can be conceived as a political style, comprising the invocation of the public as the sole source of
political legitimacy, although more ideologically articulated than merely contrarian politics (conceived
as synonymous of ‘demagoguery’). On the other side, populism can be perceived as a political tradition,
characterized by anti-intellectualism and opposition to intellectual and scientific elites. Both meanings
try to analyze why populists are considered climate change skeptics and contrary to climate change
mitigation and adaptation policies. A possible explanation may be associated with ideological content
and cultural cognition, in which political agreements, meteorological data and experts’ opinion are used
to support or refuse scientific statements on climate change (see Figure 1) [32]. This idea is included in the
analysis of cognitive bias and judgement heuristics conducted by Dunn et al. [33], in which both factors
are considered key issues when influencing individuals. One such bias to be applied on farmers and
public profiles is the “optimistic bias” or “unrealistic optimism” in which people tend to perceive their
own risk of being affected by a particular threat (any type of climate change impact) to be smaller than
the average risk supported by the community.
Adaptation to climate change impacts and risks can be limited due to different factors, including
the lack of detailed information about climate change effects; political weakness in decision-making
processes at local scale; confronted interests from socioeconomic and environmental opposed priorities;
the inefficiency of existing policies; or the role of scientists and experts [34]. This last limitation put
the focus on how lessons learned by scientists could be useful for farmers and positively perceived
by the public. In fact, two main constraints have been identified when asking for climate scientists
and experts’ roles. Firstly, climate scientists and environmentalists could be considered corrupted
(i.e., conflict-of-interest accusations2). Secondly, climate change understanding is complex, involving
different research disciplines, economic sectors and activities, or environmental risks, and this context
is ideal for promoting conspiracy theories (i.e., the ‘Climategate’ case, in which climate change scientists
are accused of manipulating data to promote climate change as human-caused) [35,36]. This public
accusation could be favored by the tendency to rely on indirect sources of information when asking
for climate change issues, more than considering personal experience as starting point for promoting
climate change action [37]. Consequently, public profiles could be divided among those who believe in
anthropogenic climate change, assuming that immediate action should be taken (catastrophists), and
those who consider climate change as natural fluctuation, assuming that actions should be taken on
a voluntary base (negationists) [38]. This paper aims to analyze the complex relationships between
farmer beliefs and public claims for climate change perception, by deepening on concerns about social
vulnerability and adaptation and perspectives on climate change actions and policies in the last 10
years. While previous research has investigated the farmers’ attitudes towards climate change risks
and adaptation issues [39] or compared farmers’ perception of climate change with meteorological
data [40], little research has explored public perception. Even less common are studies that compare the
attitudes and preferences of farmers with that of the public. According to this, two main questions will
be addressed: (1) How climate change is perceived by public-farmers’ nexus; and (2) How perception
and populism interact?
2 Most of this information has been published in newspapers: “Work of prominent climate change denier was funded
by energy industry” (Suzanne Goldenberg, 2015, The Guardian) or “Deeper ties to corporate cash for doubtful climate
researcher” (Justin Gillis and John Schwartz, 2015, The New York Times).
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Figure 1. Main political, meteorological, and social and media issues about climate change perception. 
Source: Meteorological events were selected according to three criteria: diversity (different typology 
of events), relevance (included in IPCC reports), and social recognition (disseminated by the media). 
Newspapers and webpage consultation (www.noaa.gov, www.climate.gov, www.climatecentral.org, 
www.wri.org, www.climateanalytics.org, www.politifact.com). Note: COP means (Conference of the 
Parties) and it is the supreme body of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). It holds its sessions every year in order to take decisions that are necessary to ensure the 
effectiveness  of  adaptation  policies  implementation.  During  COP24,  taking  place  in  Poland  on 
December 2018, the main objective will be to adopt a decision ensuring full implementation of the 
Paris Agreement in order to give the Paris Agreement a realistic shape by setting out a path that each 
country will decide to follow in terms of intensifying its climate protection efforts. Three key topics 
will  be  addressed:  (1)  technology  (presenting  climate‐friendly  modern  solutions);  (2)  human 
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Parties) and it is the supre e r onvention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). It s ssions every year in order to take decisions hat are necessary to ensure
the ffectiveness of daptation policies implementation. During COP24, taking place in Poland on
December 2018, the main objective will be to adopt a decision e suring full implementation of the Paris
Agreement in order t give the Paris Agreement a realistic shape by setting ou a path that eac country
will decide to follow in terms of intensifyi g its clima e protection efforts. Three key topics will be
address d: (1) technology (presenting climate-friendly mode n solutions); (2) human (emphasizing the
need to lead change together with people thr ugh the solidarity and fair transformation of regions nd
industrial sectors); and (3) nature (including multifunctional and sustainable land management and
support for a synergic view of the three United Nations key conventions: on climate, on biodiversity
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2. Materials and Methods
According to Hulme et al. [41], confronted discourses, perceptions and attitudes about climate
change can be mapped and analyzed based on complementary sources. Discussions in the media,
advances in scientific journals, political speeches and international negotiations, or public responses
and social attitudes after an extreme event associated with climate change can provide useful
information and specific details on how climate change is motivating a debate that surpasses the
geographic context and the scientific and technical focus [42]. In line with this argument, the review
process for this study included different sources: (1) literature to address farmers’ perception, (2)
public opinion surveys (Eurobarometer) to deepen on social attitudes, and (3) EU research projects to
complement both previous sources.
2.1. Literature
The analysis of the literature has been focused in two main databases: Web of Science and Scopus.
Both databases were selected due to their availability as the most current, powerful, comprehensive
and widely used search engines for peer-reviewed literature [43]. In each database, search processes
included the use of OR operator for technical aspects (impacts, barriers, scenarios) and the use of AND
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operator for social terms (attitudes, beliefs, perception). Both operators have been fixed as part of the
title of the paper. In order to identify relevant literature, we used the following search terms to ensure
a complex search string focused on the combination of technical and social components related to
public and farmers’ perception, attitudes and beliefs about climate change from 2008 to 2017, limited
to European context. Search items have been applied on “title” search topic more than in “subject”
search topic when using databases. Specific keywords are used and combined as follows (*represents a
search engine wild card):
Technical terms: climate change, scenario*, projection*, impact*, barrier*, adapt*
Social terms: percept*, attitude*, belief*, populism, scept*, support*, denial*, benefi*, particip*,
polic*, soci* farm*, agric*, irrigat*, stakeholder*
Returned papers were considered based on the inclusion criteria at three successive levels: title,
abstract and full-text. On each level, the achievement of the content analysis to each or more than one
criterion was examined (Table 1). Papers clearly focused on climate change perceptions, attitudes and
positive or negative adaptation attitudes issues, and those including transversal analysis from social
sciences such as Geography, Political Science, Economics and Sociology, to physical and life sciences
such as Agriculture, Hydrology, Earth and Environmental Sciences, have been selected.
Table 1. Admission/exclusion criteria used in literature search terms process.
Criteria Include Exclude
Peer-reviewing Peer-reviewed Everything else
Year 2008 ≤ Y ≤ 2017 Everything else
Geo-location Europe, regions Everything else *
Text language English Everything else
Subject Agriculture, environment, climate change Urban, landscape
Method Qualitative, mixed Only quantitative **
Highlighted topics Perception, adaptation, barriers, politics Only natural sciences
Note: Adapted from [44,45] * Non-European studies have been used to be compared on perception analysis.
** Literature exclusively focused on using quantitative methods and tools (such as cause-effect relation, mathematical
formulas, modelling, or statistics) have been excluded from the analysis.
The initial database search retrieved 1331 documents according to advanced search tools (Table 2).
Only records from peer-reviewed journals (article and review papers) were included for the analysis.
Therefore, books and book chapters, proceedings papers, PhD thesis, research project reports, or
industry and government documents were excluded, but can be used for identifying key issues not
previously analyzed. After screening for social terms, articles able to move on to the next step were
reduced to 830 papers (62.4% of the initial amount). All of them were selected from research criteria
number 1, which comprised the reading of article titles, abstracts and keywords. Papers from technical
terms have been consulted irregularly. The title analysis applied to each database excluded 338 papers
for different reasons: (a) papers were not clearly related to climate change effects on agriculture, land
systems nor irrigation (i.e., off-topic papers), (b) papers only focused on technical aspects (i.e., climate
change scenarios and projections; land and water uses for mitigation actions), (c) not specific to Europe.
In addition, a cross-match of the title analysis was done to identify and remove duplicated papers
(204 papers). From 492 papers selected in title analysis, only 288 papers moved to the abstract level
of analysis. During the abstract reading, 195 papers were excluded due to the lack of combination of
technical and social terms (i.e., papers focused on policy analysis, technical innovations, and mitigation
actions). However, some papers have been used to compare European results with global tendencies.
Completing the final level of the reviewing process, 93 papers were selected and the research criteria
number 2 have been applied. Full-text analysis has been conducted according to the topic: main driving
factors of climate change perception and populism from public attitudes and farmers’ beliefs. Some
limitations of this method must be recognized. On the one hand, obtained results are restricted by the
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keyword combinations used. On the other hand, interesting papers published after the analyzed period
are only referenced in the Discussion section. Finally, using only the two main research databases (Web
of Science and Scopus) excluded secondary relevant publications, some of them very interesting from
the point of view of regional case studies.
Table 2. Papers selected from database search analysis.
Database InitialSearch
Criteria 1:
Technical Terms
Criteria 2:
Social Terms
Title
Analysis
Duplicated
Papers
Abstract
Analysis
Full-Text
Analysis
Web of
Science 857 341 516 250 - 250 116
Scopus 474 160 314 242 204 38 49
TOTAL 1331 501 830 492 204 288 93
Note: The research category selection was specific for each database. In Web of Science the selected research
categories were Agriculture, Biodiversity and conservation, Environmental Sciences & Ecology, Food Science &
Technology, Meteorology & Atmospheric Sciences, Water resources, Geography, Government & Law, and Sociology.
In Scopus, we selected similar categories: Agricultural and biological sciences, Environmental sciences, Social
science, Earth and planetary sciences, engineering, Economics, econometrics, and finance.
2.2. Public Opinion Services (Eurobarometer)
Eurobarometer is a series of public opinion surveys conducted regularly on behalf of the European
Commission since 1973 [46]. Its mission is monitoring the public opinion of member states at European
level by using telephone or face-to-face interviews and digital questionnaires. The Eurobarometer
program comprises different survey series or instruments, including Special Topic Eurobarometer.
These intermittent surveys extensively address a wide variety of topical issues such as agriculture,
biotechnology, energy, environment, gender roles, immigration, information society, poverty and social
exclusion, public health, or urban traffic, providing results every two to three years. From 178 special
surveys published in the last 10 years, those special issues related to climate change, the environment
and biodiversity, and agriculture and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have been selected for
this study based on the inclusion of “climate change” as topic and/or as part of the respondents’
answers. Fifteen opinion surveys have been used for this analysis: seven surveys related to climate
change, four surveys related to environment and biodiversity, and four surveys related to agriculture
and the CAP (Table 3). The main questions addressed by the surveys are focused on: (1) Public
perceptions of the seriousness of climate change, (2) The extent to which the public feel informed
about climate change, (3) Public attitudes towards climate change and ways of combating it, and (4)
Agriculture-environment nexus to climate change. In this repeated cross-sectional design, data were
collected from 2008 to 2017.
In each year, a multi-stage random sample was drawn from approximately 1000 face-to-face
interviews per country with individuals aged 15 years and older of the European Union Member
States. The basic sample design applied in all states is a multi-stage, random (probability) one. In
each country, a number of sampling points was drawn with probability proportional to population
size (for a total coverage of the country) and to population density. In order to do so, the sampling
points were drawn systematically from each of the “administrative regional units”, after stratification
by individual unit and type of area. They thus represent the whole territory of the countries surveyed
according to the EUROSTAT NUTS II (or equivalent) and according to the distribution of the resident
population of the respective nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of the
selected sampling points, a starting address was drawn, at random. Further addresses were selected
by standard “random route” procedures, from the initial address. All interviews were conducted
face-to-face in people’s homes and in the appropriate national language. As far as the data capture
is concerned, CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal Interview) was used in those countries where this
technique was available.
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Table 3. List of Specials Topic Eurobarometer analyzed from European Commission survey data.
Special Topic Reference Numbers Years
Climate change 459, 435, 409, 372, 322, 313, 300 2017, 2015, 2014, 2011, 2009 *, 2009, 2008
Environment 468, 436 **, 365, 295 2017 ***, 2015, 2011, 2008
Agriculture and the CAP 473, 440, 410 ****, 336 2018, 2016, 2014, 2010
Note: In 2009 * a second survey was conducted in August-September according to world leaders meeting at the
United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP15) in Copenhagen in December to try and reach a follow-up
agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. ** This report is focused on biodiversity, and key questions are different from
environmental reports. *** The fieldwork conducted for the Special Topic 473 was conducted during 2017. **** This
report is not analyzed because “climate change” issue only appears in one sentence: “important objectives of the
CAP are food security, the sustainable management of natural resources, the preservation of rural economies, the
redistribution of aid between countries and between farmers, and climate change” (Introduction, p. 2).
2.3. EU Research Projects
In combination with Sustainable Development Goals and Circular Economy initiatives, European
Commission policy addresses research on topics such as climate action as one of the most
challenging problems confronting society [47]. Thematic initiatives focused on the scientific,
technical, environmental, economic and social aspects of climate change vulnerability (sensitivity and
adaptability) have been developed in recent years [48]. Among them, two research programs stand
out when analyzing climate change perception, politics and populism issues: Seventh Framework
Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7) and Joint Programming Initiative
(JPI). In the first case, the Community Research and Development Information Service (CORDIS)
database has been used to identify and select research projects funded between 2007 and 2013
(and according to this, final reports and main research advances have been already published) that
include some type of analysis on climate change perception. A search on farmers and/or public
perception has been conducted following data search portal and using search refinement (program:
FP7-Environment; subject: climate change and carbon cycle research; and content type: projects). In
addition, other subjects such as “agriculture” and “social sciences and humanities” have also been
considered without obtaining positive results. Three3 of 27 research projects have been identified
since they include perceptual analysis of climate change (focused on public consultation and debates).
A deeper analysis of these projects has not provided sufficiently positive results to be considered more
than a complementary research source. In the second case (JPI Climate), 2013 Call for transnational
collaborative research projects (topic on societal transformation in the face of climate change) has been
analyzed. One of six funded projects has been selected for deepen analysis: European perceptions of
climate change: Skepticism, energy preferences and societal information (EPCC, 2014–2017). For each
selected research project, main deliverables (reports, publications, policy briefs, participation feedback)
published on the project website have been analyzed in order to deepen on main obtained highlights.
3. Results
3.1. How Farmers Perceive Climate Change?
Factors influencing farmers’ decisions to adapt to climate change variability and potential risks
have been analyzed through a large body of literature, identifying a certain level of dependency on
climate change stimuli.
3 Action on climate change through engagement, network and tools (ACCENT, 2009–2011); Climate change and European
marine ecosystem research (CLAMER, 2009–2011); Impacts and risks rom high-end scenarios: Strategies for innovative
solutions (IMPRESSIONS, 2013–2018).
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3.1.1. Awareness, Uncertainty and Beliefs about Climate Change
The vast majority of studies identify a clear awareness of how impacts of climate change are
perceived at local scale [49–51]. In fact, research has tracked trends in public knowledge about and
perception of climate change without directly asking for the difference between being aware of the
potential risks and impacts of climate change and being aware of the uncertainties surrounding
these [52]. According to Withmarsh [53], policy actors tend to downplay or ignore scientific uncertainty
about climate change and reject alternative societal perspectives on the issue. Moreover, climate change
information campaigns by governments and environmental groups similarly use the language of
certainty and focus on the most dramatic and even apocalyptic scenarios which unchecked climate
change could bring [54]. Conversely, some studies show how extreme weather events affect climate
risk perceptions [55], while others deepen on how economic downturns do not uniformly have the
widely expected negative effect on support for climate mitigation policies [56]. In most cases, such as
the study of Chingala et al. [57], awareness is in line with meteorological variations but there was a
general uncertainty towards a number of climate change related statements [58]. This is particularly
obvious in the study of Barnes and Toma [59], in which a set of questions have been formulated. In one
of these questions, the authors ask about the possibility that climate change only impacts negatively in
the long term, obtaining high levels of ignorance and lack of information from the respondents. In the
study of Gordon et al. [60], climate change belief and attribution variable revealed that most farmers
believed that climate change is occurring. Although in the majority of studies human activities are the
causative factor of climate change [61–63], in some papers, farmers consider that climate change is
caused by natural changes and human activities equally, causing affects regional land-use and water
resources [64].
3.1.2. Perceived Climate-Related Risks and Sensitivity
Farm level operations are limited by various risks directly related to climate change impacts
and natural resources changing conditions. One of the main results obtained from the literature
is the consensus on the main climate-related observed impact: extreme maximum temperature in
summer and extreme minimum temperature in winter. The consequences of both scenarios are also
recognized. Extreme maximum temperature in summer can cause a reduction in pollination and
effects to productivity. On the opposite, extreme minimum temperature may affect the nighttime
plant respiration rates, which can potentially reduce biomass accumulation during the growth stage,
and hence the crop yield [65]. In addition, a general perception among the farmers is that the
amount of annual rainfall received decreased and ambient temperatures roses over the past two
decades [66]. Similar results have been obtained in the work of Galdies et al. [67] in which the main
belief of farmers is that warmer conditions are clearly leading to negative climate change impacts.
The multiple-mediation models conducted by Haden et al. [68] also indicate how suffering water
scarcity in the past motivates farmers’ concern for local water availability, and this increases their
motivation to fight climate change. For example, a study conducted by Deligios et al. [69] shows how,
also in environmental limiting conditions, producers could opt for a significant saving in water supply
to the crop in order to maximize and stabilize over seasons the crop yield, to obtain satisfactory yields.
This better environmentally-friendly management of water, which combines tradition (social-learning)
and innovation (water efficiency technology), can improve the quality of life for future generations
and also increase greater public belief that climate change poses a serious threat to both farmers and
themselves [70]. However, water scarcity perception and meteorological data on rainfall statistics may
differ, causing a false sensation in which farmers will be more worried about the rainfall availability
during the main crop-growing season because it is the period in which water is needed, but without
knowing the total rainfall received in their area annually [71,72]. In fact, despite being exposed to
similar information, local experiences, and adapting measures, both farmers and the public tend to
perceive climate change in different ways due to economic, environmental, cultural, and political
implications of climate change are not uniform [73].
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3.1.3. Skepticism, Obstacles and Barriers
Society needs to confront important issues in the near future, in which climate change is ranked
below topics such as food security or water-energy nexus [74]. Different reasons motivated this
situation: issue fatigue (many discussions without applying clear actions), the impact of the global
financial crisis, distrust in scientists and experts, and politicization motivated by skepticism [75].
This last factor has been one of the main topics included in several studies, in which age and
education are important determinants of skepticism about climate change [76], but also differences in
values and worldviews [77], and media-generated controversy [78]. Political ideology (or affiliation),
and membership of environmental organization were non-significant predictors of climate change
skepticism [79]. However, studies conducted by Häkkinen and Akrami [80] conclude that farmers’
skepticism of climate change correlates with lower political participation, taking into account climate
change communications regardless of ideological position. This correlation might be motivated by the
inclusion of pro-environmentalism values as part of the local government mainstream, for example [81].
3.1.4. Mitigation and Adaptation Measures
Some measures have been promoted to ensure farmers’ adaptation to climate change impacts:
Social awareness, investment in new heat-tolerant varieties, crop insurance, and support and
protection programs are the main issues driven by farmers [82]. Considering climate change from
its anthropogenic nature, the adaptation of agricultural practices was perceived as a collective
responsibility shared by scientists and farmers. Consequently, scientists must develop more
climate-resilient crops by providing extension services to supply new land and soil management
practices [83,84], while farmers must consider adaptation measures as a mechanism to provide new
food products in line with market trends and social demands [85]. Both responsibilities are based on
the belief that climate change was already happening and most adaptation statements are confirmed by
end-users, including the use of drought-resistant crops, efficient use of water, a change in cultivation
patterns, relocation of crops varieties, and effective use of fertilizers and pesticides [86]. According
to Ochieng et al. [87] and Kibue et al. [88], the type of adaptation can be divided into different issues.
Firstly, changing cropping practices (introduction of new varieties, changing planting dates). Secondly,
improving farm management practices (limited use of fertilizers/pesticides and efficiency in water
supply by investing in innovative farming technologies). Finally, introducing land management
measures (soil conservation, tree plantation).
3.1.5. Support for Action, Trust, and Political Issues
Most studies are focused on addressing direct and indirect questions to farmers as a way to
indeed on their attitudes about the role and efficiency of local governments when providing different
services and support actions related to climate change adaptation. Absence of public supporters
working for farmers’ interests is perceived as one of the main concerns expressed by the majority
of the farmers [89,90]. Although most farmers are aware of the role of local authorities in providing
information about the affection of climate change, they reclaim more details concerning how risks
arising from climate change can be reduced [91]. In addition, studies like those conducted by
Hobson and Niemeyer [92] call for combining information with political leadership: without which,
farmers and individuals are less likely themselves to respond to attempts to adapt to climate change.
Engels et al. [93] identified a positive correlation between climate-change skepticism, low social status
and old age, but also to political party linked to conservatism. In fact, political and cultural context
defines most of the factors involved in climate-change skepticism approaches [94]. According to
Hornsey et al. [95], farmers do not usually follow this rule, and the findings provided by the study
of Guy et al. [96] indicate that knowledge and information can play a key role in limiting the impact
of political ideologies on farmers’ opinions of climate change. However, polarization of political
discourses can increase the harshness between opposing opinions, especially in those contexts where
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there is a clear opposition to change [97]. Sometimes, this rejection to change can be explained by the
nexus between rural development and farmers’ identity (i.e., by promoting farming practices capable
of representing the roles, values, and identity of rural communities), as suggested by Feola et al. [98].
A synthesis of the main issues considered by farmers when explaining their perception on climate
change risks and challenges are detailed in Figure 2. Farmers considered that questions about scientific
consensus and political will are positive issues when addressing climate change, while knowledge
gaps, skepticism, and meteorological vulnerability are considered main limitations to achieve climate
change adaptation.
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3.2. How the Public Perceives Cli ate Change and Far ers’ Role?
The invisibility of the causes that have motivated climate change and the difficulty of predicting or
adequately analyzing the impacts of climate change and their dissemination justifies a lack of temporal
and geogr phic comprehension [99]. According t Hagen et l. [100], although the public largely
supports policy action to address climate change, they are contrary to individual tax measures. In order
to deepen on these questions, public perceptions have been analyzed by combining Eurobarometer
reports a d U research p oj cts.
3.2.1. Climate Change Reports
In-depth analysis of Eurobarometer reports on climate change have been structured in two
main questions:
Question 1: cli ate c a s s ri s rl r l
This question is divided i t ifi j t : ( ) t cli ate change as one of the
most serious problems at world level, (2) e el f i climate change on
a scale from 1 to , - i l a social profiles. A cording to the reports,
climate change is currently ra e t i t st serious orld problems (behind
poverty, hunger and lack of drinki t , , ile ten years ago climate
change was ranked second (62%). Despite this declin in r levance, the degree of seriousness (conc rn)
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attributed to climate change has increased (from 7.5 in 2008 to 7.7 in 2017), especially since 2015 (Paris
Agreement) (Figure 3). In terms of socio-demographic profile, women are more likely to describe
climate change as a serious problem (average score of 7.5 compared to 7.2 amongst men). Older
citizens are less concerned, with those aged 55 and over giving on average a score of 7.2 compared to
7.4/7.5 amongst younger citizens. Similarly, retired people tended to view the issue less seriously. This
result is in line with the Climate change and European marine ecosystem research (CLAMER) project,
conducted between 2009 and 2011 with the aim of assessing the publics’ perception and knowledge of
EU research on climate change impacts. Although the project is focused on marine ecosystems, the
public is also asked about general perceptions of major global risks, obtaining an 18% of agree on the
consideration of climate change as the most serious problem facing the world.
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(although during the years 2011 and 2013 the percentage was significantly lower, 10% in 2011 and
16% in 2013). Moreover, respondents recognize that fighting climate change will only be effective if all
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Figure 4. Responsibility to fight climate change. Note: * Only the survey conducted in
August-September 2009 asked about responsibility on fighting climate change. ** The 2008 survey did
not include Regional and local authorities and Environmental groups as options, and 2009 and 2011
surveys only included Regional and local authorities as an option.
3.2.2. Environ ent and griculture Reports
Questions about how environmental and agricultural issues are in line with climate change
concerns have been selected. Four reports focused on environmental issues include questions in which
climate change is considered. Two main questions have also been selected:
Question 1: General associations with the environment
This question aims to identify the first association (from a list of predefined topics) with the term
“environment”. Respondents associate environmental pollution in towns and cities to climate change.
Consequently, concern associated to environmental and climate change nexus has clearly increased in
the last ten years: from 19% (2008) to 51% (2017). Furthermore, two of the main attributes traditionally
associated to the environment were green landscapes and environmental protection, without receiving
negative connotations.
Question 2: Main environmental concerns
The focus of this question was directly focused on identifying which type of environmental
concerns5 are more recognized by society. On the previous question respondents consider that climate
change is associated with the concept of environment, and therefore, it is not surprising that climate
change is considered one of the main concerns among Europeans (57% in 2008 and 51% in 2017, but
only 34% in 2011) mentioning it among their top five environmental concerns. Around two in five
respondents also mention water and air pollution, and human disasters.
5 The 2015 report is focused on biodiversity and the question about environmental concerns has not been included.
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In addition, four Eurobarometer reports on agriculture and the CAP have also been considered.
All of them include a special section (Section 4) focused on agriculture and climate change nexus. In
this section, two main questions have been formulated.
Question 1: Helping farmers to fight climate change
A vast majority of respondents support the new objectives for agriculture and rural development
included in the last reforms of the CAP, including the preservation of the countryside as a landscaping
value and the conviction that farmers should receive support to face the consequences of climate
change. In 2010 and 2014 reports, this percentage was around 80% or more, while in 2016 and 2018
reports has decreased to 50%. In 2016 report, the respondents with a strong political view, are more
likely to think the benefit agriculture and rural landscape provide is contributing to fight climate
change (75%) than those with a low political view (66%).
Question 2: Agriculture contribution in fighting climate change
About half of respondents (46% in 2010) and more than two-thirds of respondents (68% in 2016)
positively consider the proactive attitude of farmers in fighting climate change. However, current
sustainable practices and adaptation measures promoted by farmers are not sufficient, and further
action should be considered, including the option to change the way in which farmers work (82% in
2014). This claim for a greater involvement of farmers in fighting climate change (77% in 2014 and
65% in 2018) also aims to deal with those risks and impacts magnified by climate change and directly
suffered by farmers. The results also suggest that almost one in three respondents in 2018 are ready to
pay 10% more for agricultural products if these products have been produced under sustainable and
climate change-limiting measures. Although this percentage has been decreased over time (58% in
2010), the current result is in line with one of the transformative strategies proposed by the Impacts
and risks rom high-end scenarios: Strategies for innovative solutions (IMPRESSIONS) project. This
strategy was based on the promotion of climate friendly intensive agricultural practices in order to
open its product to a more demanding but also more economically valuable food market. Such support
is remarkable, considering that almost two thirds (61% in 2010) of the respondents considered that
agriculture is not one of the major causes of climate change but half of respondents (50% in 2018)
consider tackling climate change should be the main responsibility of farmers, as well as the main
objective for agricultural and rural policy.
3.2.3. Research Projects
Results from Eurobarometer reports have been contrasted with specific results obtained from
selected EU research projects. Those projects selected from FP7 Environment program have included
specific issues related to climate changes as promotion of action campaigns, identification of major risks,
or asking for public strategies in order to address climate change. The Action on climate change through
engagement, network and tools (ACCENT) project, for example, aimed to increase public mobilization
when addressing climate change actions by ensuring the exchange and dissemination of good practices.
One of the main dissemination activities was “The I Do campaign” as a mechanism for communicating
the science of climate change in Europe. Accordingly, the messages clearly communicated were: (1)
Climate change is happening and the effects are long-term; (2) Adaptation actions will mitigate climate
change causes; and (3) There are risks to the “do-nothing” option. The study confirmed that people
consider climate change as a serious problem that requires urgent actions (coinciding with what was
expressed in the Eurobarometer reports on agriculture and environment). The public considers that
the media (radio, TV and newspapers), movies and books pay little attention to global warming, and
they would like more information on the global warming impacts on human health, and on what they
can do to reduce global warming. Another important point is how information on climate change
is presented: messages are intermittent, confused, alarmist and contradictory. Therefore, people
have difficulty understanding an issue and making decisions. In fact, the information-action nexus is
considered one of the main concerns when asking for climate change. According to this, the EPCC
project aimed to identify the structure of climate change perception in different European countries
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(France, Germany, Norway and UK) by asking for the role of individual and contextual socio-political6
values. Two main questions have been selected according to these values.
Question 1: Images of climate change
Perception of climate change is mostly focused on the nature of the image associated with natural
and anthropogenic impacts. Respondents considered that weather changes, including the weather
becoming wetter, hotter, or simply more extreme and unpredictable, are the best form to be aware of
the consequences of climate change.
Question 2: Climate change beliefs
This question includes three main topics: beliefs, feelings, and salvation. Beliefs about the level of
awareness and main natural and anthropogenic causes of climate change are analyzed to measure trend
skepticism. In order to achieve this goal, the project asked respondents whether they think climate
change was happening or not. In all four countries, a majority of respondents (83–92%) considered that
the world’s climate is changing, and this alteration is motivated and caused at least partly by human
activity (83–91%). However, this majority tends to differ according to the level of human responsibility
in addressing climate change impacts. For example, about one in three and one-half of the respondents
(34–55%) considered human activity as the main or the exclusive cause of climate change, while a
similar percentage (34–57%) considered that climate change is caused by the combination of natural
processes and human activities. Psychological distance of climate change (as understood as feelings
towards climate change) has been analyzed and a majority in all four countries (60–61%) consider
that the effects of climate change are already identified and perceived by the whole society depending
on space and time. On the contrary, only 2–5% of the respondents answered that they would start
feeling the effects of climate change in the next 100 years or beyond. Finally, respondents are asked
about the role of science in providing solutions to address climate change impacts. This question is
in line with those technical approaches in which science, innovation and technology are conceived
to fight complex environmental problems, such as climate change. The obtained results in France
and Germany show how people were skeptical that science and technology would eventually solve
their problems with climate change (46% and 38% respectively). The situation is inverse in Norway
and UK, in which more than half of the respondents (56%) and four in ten of the respondents (40%)
respectively trust in technological advances and innovation to fight climate change. A synthesis of
the main issues considered by farmers when explaining their perception on climate change risks and
challenges are detailed in Figure 5. The public considered that questions about scientific prestige
and political agreements are positive issues when addressing climate change, while uncertainty from
experts, skepticism and short-term solutions, and populism are limiting the adaptation to climate
change scenarios.
6 National analysis about the socio-political profile of each country provides two main key issues. On the one hand, France
and Germany counts with a national government which develops and applies adaptation policies at regional level; NGO
and civil society organization are represented in state consultative bodies for discussing measures to mitigate climate
change; and very small fringe of scientists who deny climate change. In the opposite site, Norway and France present a
cognitive dissonance: for example, Norway seeks a climate-friendly image at home and abroad, while being unable to curb
its domestic emissions and maintaining fossil fuel exports at relatively high levels. In UK, political sector has a history of
framing nuclear power as a solution to climate change, while public perception research identifies a consistent preference
for renewable energy.
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4. Discussion
Are the farmers aware of climate change and the associated risks? What are the factors that
influence this awareness and farmers’ perceptions? How will they adapt? Is the public aware of the
climate risk faced by farmers? Is climate change one of the main environmental concerns cited by the
public? How the public perceives farmers’ role in fighting climate change? Some of these questions
have been addressed in the previous sections by confronting public and farmers’ attitudes and climate
change perception. According to Torabi et al. [101], awareness occurs as both the public and farmers
learn through their social networks (including friends, family, and neighbors) but also from personal
experience. However, questions about the role of the media and its ability to generate opinion and
promote debate that will be subsequently incorporated into the speeches of both the public and farmers
are also relevant although they are not included in the literature, opinion surveys or research projects
duly analyzed. In fact, both farmers and the public are indirectly aware of the role played by the
media through opinion and blog sections or science-based editorials [102]. Research conducted by
Gavin and Marshall [103] suggests that trust in entities that are working to address climate change is
associated with support for climate change policy, while trust in private services (i.e., industry) and the
media historically opposed to action on climate change is associated with skepticism and inaction to
address climate change impacts. The question posed by this duality is how to address climate change
perception by considering technical, political and societal changes and media interests.
Ahead of the global climate conference COP24, the European Investment Bank launched a
first-of-its-kind climate survey, in partnership with the global public opinion company YouGov, to find
out how 25,000 citizens feel towards climate change in the European Union, the United States and
China. First key findings show the public sentiment towards climate change in the European Union.
These highlight a geographical disparity between the North and the South. Southern Europeans are
particularly concerned about the impacts of climate change and see it much more as an immediate
threat. They also believe it is mostly caused by human activities. On the contrary, northern Europeans
are less worried about climate change and less convinced of the impact of human activities. Although
the survey does not provide sociodemographic profiles of the respondents, uncertainty, coupled with
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skepticism, is identified as a common finding when asking about sentiments on climate change. Our
analysis is in line with this statement as climate change has a domino effect on both farmers and the
public, often starting with a concerned sentiment towards direct or indirect impacts on environmental,
agricultural, economic and social domains [104,105]. The survey also reflects how experiencing
physical manifestations of climate change at regional scale contribute to farmers’ adaptation, while
scientific uncertainties and political incomprehension limit the social concern and the need to act [106].
Our analysis from Eurobarometer and research projects have also proved that personal experience of
climate change is interdependent with the belief that climate change is happening. What is noticeable
from this result is that the greater the years of farmers’ farming experiences the greater the percentage
rate of their climate change awareness. This contrasts with the attitude of the public according to
the Eurobarometer reports, in which climate change generates fatigue in older generations while
brings back the consciousness of the youngest and drives adaptation measures. However, one of the
main limitations of both sources is that they are unable to deepen into why society and farmers are
aware and are concerned about climate change, focusing merely on statements or denials of specific
postulates and perceived ambiguity [107].
An interesting exercise to overcome this limitation is to compare farmers and the public
perceptions about which issues can be positively or negatively considered when addressing climate
change. Both farmers and the public coincide in highlighting scientific consensus and prestige as
key strengths to fighting climate change, although farmers also emphasize the role of technology
(technosalvation) and the public accentuates the role of the popular mandate. However, a major
challenge for raising awareness of climate change and motivating active adaptation measures is
the dissemination of scientific information in terms that are understandable to the layman: that is,
anyone without scientific training, including many decision makers [108]. Moreover, both social
groups also agree to identify knowledge gaps or scientific uncertainty from experts, and political
incomprehension as main weaknesses, even though farmers insist on the role of the media and
the public urges to put attention to climate extreme events in order to understand climate change
challenges. Although political incomprehension is considered a weakness by farmers and the public,
both of them trust in political will as the most effective way to reach agreements between confronted
interests. Nonetheless, both farmers and the public differ in how they press politicians to encourage
climate change corrective actions. On the one hand, farmers put the focus on previous experience in
managing climate change risks as a mechanism to persuade politicians about best adaptation measures.
Contrarily, the public aims to promote individual and societal responsibilities by taking advantage of
local knowledge and social-learning approaches. In fact, both strategies are unequivocally promoted by
farmers and the public as mechanisms to face skepticism, reduce meteorological risks and to overcome
short-term solutions.
Adaptation can be constrained not only by technical difficulties or scientific disagreements, but
also for the absence of political will and consensus, opposed cultural factors, lack of governance,
confronted strategies, debated worldviews, discussed norms or incomprehensible behaviors. Among
all these limiting factors, both farmers and the public coincide in highlighting how climate change
has become a political contrivance [109,110]. According to Wolf et al. [111] social and cultural values
on climate change adaptation can play a key role when analyzing the perception of risk, what type
of action could be addressed according to usefulness, or how vulnerability and resilience would be
included in the management of natural and human activities. Consequently, a significant need to
develop innovative methods able to increase social-learning and promote comprehensible climate
information in line with farmers and the public attitudes and demands is needed [112]. For example, if
national policies support climate change measures duly implemented by farmers based on their local
knowledge and experience as a bottom-up approach, their adaptation capacity will increase and their
activity will be less vulnerable to climate change effects [113–115]. Moreover, the promotion of policy
game decision support mechanisms could play an extremely significant role in instigating policy action
to support the implementation of adaptation measures by the public, bridging the familiarity gap
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with stories and metaphors, as demonstrated in Onencan and Van de Walle research [116]. Another
method for awareness-raising is the Climate Twins approach, duly applied in urban context in order to
illustrate the amplitude and celerity of climate change but also in rural context to determine climate
change impacts on agriculture and their associated adaptation options [117]. In both contexts, this
method could be used as a communication tool to raise the population’s awareness about the expected
impacts of climate change. Likewise, adaptive capacity can be limited by the inconsistency between
meteorological records and communication of public and farmers’ observations and perceptions [118].
In fact, the perception of both farmers and the public is separately formulated from scientists: whereas
scientists make highly global assessments by considering few common variables applied to specific
case studies in order to extrapolate conclusions to other places, farmers and the public perceive climatic
trends based on their assessment of the frequency and intensity of climate data at local scale. However,
the public tends to put attention to climatic data obtained by scientists more than focus their attention
to farmers’ experience.
Climate change adaptation and mitigation measures are in line with the terms ‘responsibility’
and ‘action’. The results obtained from the Eurobarometer analysis show how although so many
people are concerned about climate change, environmental issues, food security, and sustainability,
more of them not doing what is necessary to address these challenges. Some observers suggest
that this is motivated by a climate change denier–believer debate in which politics could defend
skepticism as a mechanism to reject climate science [119]. In a number of societies, views about climate
change divide sharply along partisan lines. As it can be extracted from the EPCC project, in different
economically advanced nations, such as France, Germany and the UK, those on the political left are
significantly more likely than those on the right to view climate change as a major threat. Gifford [120]
and Lacroix and Gifford [121] suggest that politicians tend to use different psychological barriers as
factors able to limit climate change behavior change (ensuring populism). Four of these barriers can be
applied when analyzing farmers and public climate change perception: (1) Ignorance (not knowing
that a problem exists and/or not knowing what to do once one becomes aware of the problem); (2)
Undervaluing future risks (spatial discounting of environmental problems); (3) Perceived behavioral
control and self-efficacy (people do not act because their actions will not have much impact), and (4)
Technosalvation (support geoengineering as a tool in the struggle against further global warming).
According to our analysis, the public tends to include the first two barriers when they want to justify
their inaction and the politicians’ role, while the second two are justified by farmers in order to be
more resilient at local level and pressure the politicians to adopt actions to redress the effects of climate
change on agriculture.
5. Conclusions
Climate change is more complex than any other environmental problem. Agricultural practices
are exposed to multiple, simultaneous and interconnected ecological, economic and social pressures
motivated by climate change. According to this, agriculture is also growing in prominence within the
political agendas of national and international agencies, in which debates about how to feed a growing
global population under increasing constraints of water and land resources scarcity and climate change
impacts are frequent. Information about climate change is disseminated using different platforms and
formats, from technical issues and reports to research projects, and from survey opinions to the media.
However, information is unlikely to be clearly assimilated because public and farmers’ perception is
not neutral: while the evidence for anthropogenic climate change grows stronger, uncertainty remains
on the social, economic, moral and political aspects of climate change.
Climate change is not viewed as a distant threat. Across the literature review and surveys,
more attention has been paid to meteorological data and modelling, climate change impacts, and
adaptation and risk assessment, but relatively little attention has been devoted to the perception
and awareness of farmers and the public when adapting to climate change. What is apparent is
the gap between politicians’ discourses, scientists’ analysis, farmers’ awareness, and public’ beliefs
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of climate change. For example, differences among farmers and public perceptions were noted.
Uncertainty, coupled with skepticism, the media, and political will, are common findings when
asking to farmers and the public for the main weaknesses in adaptation to climate change. However,
scientific consensus, meteorological data and projections, barriers to adaptation, and the positive role of
technology (nicknamed “technosalvation” for its ability to cope with climate change risks) are subjects
in which both differ. This is partly explained by the fact that (1) confronting climate change will require
significant changes in the public and farmers’ lifestyles, and (2) views about climate change break
sharply along partisan, gender and generational lines. Both issues could be merge if local knowledge
is integrated into climate change policies and actions as a mechanism to increase legitimacy of the
decision-making process, especially when evaluating farmers and the public perception. On one hand,
it helps to give policy more consistency and steadiness into agricultural practices that attempt to bring
about reshaping cropping calendars or fighting rainfall variability at local levels. On the other hand, it
promotes public comprehension about farmers’ role and attitudes towards climate change adaptation.
This may demand that adaptation interventions search for solutions together with farmers and public
rather than prescribing solutions misunderstood by the public.
Examining the perceived importance of climate change impacts and differences in knowledgebase
among farmers will help researchers, politicians, and policy makers delineate effective measures
and mechanisms, which could ultimately reveal new and potentially beneficial insights into farmers’
attitude changes. Much of the current research depends on (1) how farmers perceive climate change
impacts and how they face the challenges in order to ensure its activity, and (2) how the public value
the role of the farmer in addressing climate change. However, both approaches are rarely linked in a
direct way, and there is no clear feedback between farmers and public actions. Future research needs
to put a greater focus on how the public and farmers perceive climate change through a joint analysis,
taking advantage of some of the tools and approaches provided in the literature in which confronted
values, behaviors and attitudes about climate change include real-world viewpoints (local experience
and knowledge) and scientific results (meteorological data and projections). In order to succeed in this
task, it would be useful to support cross-cultural research in anthropology, sociology, geography, and
other fields on the issue of climate change to deepen understanding contextual (scientific) and cultural
(social-learning) factors that influence individual and group attitudinal and behavioral outcomes.
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